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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION IN TAIWAN
BEFORE AND DURING THE TSAI ADMINISTRATION
Ernest Caldwell†
Abstract: The Republic of China on Taiwan (“Taiwan”) successfully and
peacefully transitioned from authoritarian, one-party rule into a constitutional democracy
in the early 1990s. However, due to the island’s complex international status and fraught
relationship with China, as well as a rather conservative government approach to postauthoritarian discourse on past human rights violations, there has been relatively little
scholarly interest in Anglophone academia on Taiwanese transitional justice issues. This
Article seeks to deepen our understanding of East Asian transitional justice by examining
the influence of post-democratization local conditions on the scope and language of
transitional justice legislation during two phases of Taiwan’s legislative history. The first
period runs from the initial steps towards democratization in 1987 until 2016. During this
time the Chinese Nationalist Party, which governed the former authoritarian regime,
continued to dominate the Taiwanese government, and, in particular, retained its majority
in the Legislative Yuan. The second period runs from January 2016 to the present. During
this second period, the Democratic Progressive Party managed to secure both the
presidency and a legislative majority.
Cite as: Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During
the Tsai Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 449 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article seeks to deepen our understanding of East Asian
transitional justice by examining the influence of post-democratization local
conditions on the scope and language of transitional justice legislation in
Taiwan. To date, scholarly studies in the field of transitional justice cover a
wide range of geographical jurisdictions, historical periods, and theoretical
debates, as well as various forms of conflict and modes of post-conflict
resolution.1 The results of numerous case studies elaborating on European,
Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African experiences have further served
to refine and advance the field of transitional justice. Until recently, however,
few Anglophone publications have given much attention to contemporary

†

[BA, MA, LLM, PHD]; Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Laws of China and Taiwan, SOAS
University of London. The author wishes to thank Chang Bi-yu, Chang Wen-chen, Leigh Jenco, Catherine
Jenkins, Scott Newton, Lutz Oette, and the students from my 2017 “Law, Rights and Society in Taiwan”
course for all their helpful comments and discussions.
1
See, e.g., Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69 (2003); Thomas
Obel Hansen, The Vertical and Horizontal Expansion of Transitional Justice: Explanations and Implications
for a Contested Field, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORIES 105 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al. eds., 2014).
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transitional justice issues and practices in East Asian jurisdictions (e.g., China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan).2
Individuals and groups within many of these countries experienced
various levels of abuse during long periods of colonial and/or authoritarian
rule. As some of these countries transitioned into democracies, their
governments and citizenry were often forced to confront the grievous human
rights violations of the past. The countries’ attempts to address these
violations often drew upon lessons learned from transitional justice
experiences of Europe, Africa, and Latin America, yet in the end their aims
and practices were frequently tailored to localized contexts.3 As is often the
case, the local social, political, and economic conditions of democratic
transition either facilitated or constrained the availability of specific pathways
to justice, as well as the very conceptualization of post-transition justice.4
The Republic of China on Taiwan (“Taiwan”) successfully and
peacefully transitioned from authoritarian one-party rule into a constitutional
democracy in the early 1990s. However, due to the island’s complex
international status and fraught relationship with China, as well as a rather
conservative government approach to post-authoritarian discourse on past
human rights violations, there has been relatively little scholarly interest in
Anglophone academia on Taiwanese transitional justice issues.5
2

With the exception of studies on Japanese war crimes during World War II, there are few
publications providing coverage of contemporary East Asian experiences with transitional justice. See, e.g.,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC (Renée Jeffery & Hun Joon Kim eds., 2014); INHERITED
RESPONSIBILITY AND HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION IN EAST ASIA (Jun-Hyeok Kwak & Melissa Nobles eds.,
2013).
3
See Leigh A. Payne & Kathryn Sikkink, Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific: Comparative and
Theoretical Perspectives, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 2, at 33.
4
For examples of the issues related to translating international norms and expectations into local
contexts, see generally LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS
VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw et al. eds., 2010); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL
REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2010); LIA KENT, THE
DYNAMICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL MODELS AND LOCAL REALITIES IN EAST TIMOR
(2012).
5
For notable exceptions, see Naiteh Wu, Transition without Justice, or Justice without History:
Transitional Justice in Taiwan, 1 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 77 (2005); Vincent Wei-cheng Wang & Samuel
Chang-yung Ku, Transitional Justice and Prospect of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Democracy and
Justice in Newly Democratized Countries, GUOJIA FAZHAN YANJIU (國家發展研究) [J. NAT’L DEV. STUD.],
July 2005, at 1; JUSTICE RESTORED?: BETWEEN REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION IN CHINA AND
TAIWAN (Agnes Schick-Chen & Astrid Lipinsky eds., 2012). The recent increase in transitional justice
discourse in Taiwan has resulted in new English-language research, for example Jau-Yuan Hwang,
Transitional Justice in Postwar Taiwan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN 169
(Gunter Schubert ed., 2016); Ian Rowen & Jamie Rowen, Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee:
The Geopolitics of Transitional Justice in a Contested State, 11 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 92 (2017).
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This dearth of analysis is unfortunate, because the study of Taiwan
offers important insights into the impact of localized post-transition political
dynamics on governmental responses to past human rights abuses. In most
post-transitional societies, for example, it is common for the former ruling
party to dissolve or experience a significant loss of political power.6 Likewise,
the primary actors of the party tend to experience some form of sanction for
their actions, such as lustration, vetting, and often criminal prosecution. 7 In
Taiwan, however, the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang,
國民黨, “KMT”) directed the process of democratization beginning in 1987.
It also maintained its control over the presidency from 1992 until 2000 as well
as the democratically elected legislature from 1992 until 2016. Furthermore,
due to the significant reduction of state violence during the waning years of
martial law and the tremendous economic growth of Taiwan under KMT
stewardship, when the island transitioned to democracy there was an initial
ambivalence within major portions of the population towards “punishing” the
KMT through transitional justice mechanisms.8
This Article examines the influence of post-democratization local
conditions on the scope and language of transitional justice legislation during
two phases of Taiwan’s legislative history. The first period ran from the initial
steps towards democratization in 1987, up until 2016. During this time, the
KMT continued to dominate the Taiwanese government, and retained its
majority in the country’s unicameral legislature, known as the Legislative
Yuan (Li fa yuan 立法院). The second period ran from January 2016 to the
present. During this second period, the Democratic Progressive Party (Min
jin dang, 民 進 黨 , “DPP”) managed to secure both the presidency and a
legislative majority.
During the first era, the former authoritarian KMT retained a majority
voice in the elected legislature and dictated Taiwan’s pathway to transitional
justice. The KMT was thus able to limit any legislation requiring
accountability or the possibility of prosecution for past abuses occurring
6

See, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 160–69 (2000) (examining the purges of political
parties in post-Soviet Europe).
7
See Lavinia Stan, Lustration and Vetting, in AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 137
(Olivera Simić ed., 2017); Rachel Kerr, International Criminal Justice, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 47 (Olivera Simić ed., 2017).
8
See Wu, supra note 5, at 93 (“[T]he remote moment of repression combined with the fresh memory
of satisfactory economic performance have largely decreased the demand for transitional justice.”).
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during the forty years in which the party held absolute power. Unable to fully
ignore calls for confronting past abuses, the KMT-dominated legislature
passed three pieces of transitional-justice legislation during this period that
provided limited reparations and restoration of honor to a narrow category of
victims.
During the second period, the DPP succeeded in winning not only the
presidency, but more importantly, it won an elected majority in the legislature
for the first time in Taiwan’s history. Victory in the legislature allowed the
current DPP government to actively pursue transitional justice legislation with
minimal concern over interference from the KMT. Furthermore, the election
leading up to 2016 reinvigorated transitional justice discourse in Taiwan.
Since the rise of the DPP, there have been numerous legislative bills related
to transitional justice submitted by various groups, including the KMT. 9
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the historical events
giving rise to the need for transitional justice in Taiwan. Part III examines the
language and scope of transitional justice legislation passed by the KMTdominated legislature against the backdrop of the process of democratization.
Part IV examines the reinvigoration of transitional justice discourse during the
presidential and legislative campaigning for the 2016 elections, as well as its
influence on the scope and language of legislative bill proposals made by the
DPP after the party’s electoral victories. Part V concludes by considering the
future of transitional justice legislation in Taiwan.
II.

TAIWANESE SOURCES OF INJUSTICE

Scholars typically categorize Taiwan’s sources of historical injustice
within three distinct periods.10 The first period began in 1895 when, shortly
after suffering a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the imperial
government of Qing China (清, 1644–1911) was forced to sign the Treaty of
Shimonoseki (下関条約, April 17, 1895) with Japan. As one of the conditions
of the treaty, the Chinese government ceded control over the island of Taiwan

9

Proposed Bill, Kuomintang dangtuan (國民黨黨團) [KMT Caucus], Zhuanxing zhengyi ji cujin

renmin tuanjie yu hejie tiaoli caoan (轉型正義及促進人民團結與和解條例草案) [Transitional Justice and
the
Promotion
of
Societal
Unification
and
Reconciliation
Bill]
(2017),
http://lci.ly.gov.tw/LyLCEW/agenda1/02/pdf/09/03/10/LCEWA01_090310_01505.pdf.
10
Hwang, supra note 5, at 169–70.
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to the Japanese Empire.11 Taiwan would not return to Chinese rule until the
end of World War II in 1945.
Under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the local Taiwanese
population benefited greatly from improvements to agriculture, medicine, and
sanitation, increased education and literacy levels (in Japanese), and
heretofore unknown levels of bureaucratic efficiency and legal
modernization.12 But during this time, the local population also suffered from
a variety of political, civil, and economic abuses, such as a lack of
representation in the Japanese Diet, media censorship, restrictive government
monopolies, and land expropriation.13
The colonial period of Taiwan has been well documented in the fields
of history and literary studies. However, transitional and historical justice
theories and mechanisms are rarely applied to the study of the island’s history
prior to its retrocession to the Republic of China in 1945. 14 This
governmental—and even scholarly—“disinterest” in the Japanese colonial
period is particularly problematic when confronting the treatment of Taiwan’s
aboriginal population and the Japanese expropriation of aboriginal lands.15 As
a result, many of the century-old transitional and historical justice issues of
Taiwan’s indigenous communities remain unresolved.16
11

Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, arts. 3, 4, Japan-China, 181 CONSOL. T.S. 217.
See, e.g., TAY-SHENG WANG, LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE, 1895–
1945: THE RECEPTION OF WESTERN LAW (2000); Harry J. Lamley, Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945:
The Vicissitudes of Colonialism, in TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 201 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 2007).
13
See generally HUI-YU CAROLINE TS’AI, TAIWAN IN JAPAN’S EMPIRE-BUILDING: AN INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO COLONIAL ENGINEERING (2009).
14
The main Anglophone studies of human rights and transitional justice all explicitly leave out
consideration of Taiwan’s colonial period. See Wu, supra note 5, at 84–85; Daniel Bowman, Righting the
Wrongs of the Past?: The Human Rights Policies of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, in TAIWAN SINCE
MARTIAL LAW: SOCIETY, CULTURE, POLITICS, ECONOMY 485 (David Blundell ed., 2012); Hwang, supra note
5, at 169 .
15
See, e.g., Scott Simon, Making Natives: Japan and the Creation of Indigenous Formosa, in
JAPANESE TAIWAN: COLONIAL RULE AND ITS CONTESTED LEGACY 75 (Andrew D. Morris ed., 2015); Lee
12

Ming-cheng (李明政), Yuan zhu min she hui sheng huo fa zhan yu zhuan xing zheng yi (原住民社會生活發
展與轉型正義) [Transitional Justice and the Development of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples’ Social Life],
6 TAIWAN YUAN ZHU MIN ZU YAN JIU XUE BAO (台灣原住民族學報) [J. TAIWAN INDIGENOUS STUD. ASS’N]
97 (2016).
16
See generally JOLAN HSIEH, COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: IDENTITY-BASED
MOVEMENT OF PLAIN INDIGENOUS IN TAIWAN (2006); Hsieh Jolan & Wu Ming-chi (謝若蘭 & 吳明季),
Zhuan xing zheng yi de si kao yu shi jian (轉型正義的思考與實踐) [Perspectives on Taiwanese Indigenous
Peoples’ Transitional Justice], 6 TAIWAN YUAN ZHU MIN ZU YAN JIU XUE BAO (台灣原住民族學報) [J.
TAIWAN INDIGENOUS STUD. ASS’N] 1 (2016).
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Most studies of transitional justice in Taiwan begin with the second
historical period, covering the return of the island to Chinese control at the
end of World War II. 17 More specifically, transitional justice discourse in
post-democratization Taiwan focuses rather myopically on the policies and
actions of the KMT during the authoritarian period. This is at the expense of
a more comprehensive approach to historical justice that would seek to
address wrongs spanning two types of regimes—and for which there were
numerous, often overlapping victims.
Given the length of the Japanese colonial period and the many positive
contributions the Japanese administration made to Taiwanese society,
Taiwan’s return to a KMT-led government by the Republic of China created
a great deal of uncertainty and a crisis of identity among Taiwan’s
population. 18 Similarly, there was uncertainty and mistrust among the
mainland Chinese citizenry who had just endured several brutal years of war
with Japan.19 Furthermore, the draining of Taiwan’s resources back to the
mainland to assist the KMT’s war against the communist forces of Mao
Zedong (毛澤東), the existence of unfair government monopolies, and the
poor local administration led to mounting tensions between the local
Taiwanese population and the newly arrived mainland population of soldiers,
policemen, and bureaucrats.20
Tensions reached a climax on February 27, 1947, when a Taiwanese
woman illegally selling cigarettes suffered abuse at the hands of the
government’s Tobacco Monopoly inspectors.21 Taiwanese citizens present at
the incident threatened the inspectors, one of whom shot and killed a citizen.22
The following day, the local Taiwanese population stormed the police
headquarters and riots and protests broke out island-wide. 23 The national

17

See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 5, at 169; Agnes Schick-Chen, Coming to Terms with the Past on Both
Sides of the Taiwan Strait: Historical and Political Context, in JUSTICE RESTORED?: BETWEEN
REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN, supra note 5, at 9; SYLVIA LI-CHUN LIN,
REPRESENTING ATROCITY IN TAIWAN: THE 2/28 INCIDENT AND WHITE TERROR IN FICTION AND FILM (2007).
18
STEVEN E. PHILLIPS, BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE: THE TAIWANESE ENCOUNTER
NATIONALIST CHINA, 1945–1950 41–44 (2003).
19
Id.
20
LAI TSE-HAN ET AL., A TRAGIC BEGINNING: THE TAIWAN UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 28, 1947 73–99
(1991).
21
Id. at 102–03.
22
Id. at 103.
23
Id. at 105–06.
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government responded by dispatching soldiers from the mainland to quell the
populace.24
Over the next few months, the mainland soldiers and police forces
assaulted, imprisoned, and killed thousands of Taiwanese. 25 The exact
numbers of Taiwanese killed during the months following the initial event
remains unknown. According to the report by the Taiwan Provincial Garrison
Command issued shortly after the event, 398 people were killed, 72 were still
missing, and 2131 were injured; however, subsequent reports give figures
ranging from 5000 to 28,000 deaths.26 The 228 Incident (二二八事件), as it
is now known, lasted for only a few months, but the scale of abuses suffered
by the Taiwanese people remains a painful source of social division between
the mainlanders (those ethnic Chinese arriving from the Chinese mainland
after 1945) and Taiwanese even today.27
By 1948, the KMT was losing the civil war on the mainland to the
communist forces of Mao Zedong. President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石),
along with the Republic of China legislature, promulgated the Temporary
Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (“Temporary
Provisions”), 28 which instituted a state of emergency, gave the president
extraordinary powers, and suspended the vast majority of civil and political
rights enshrined within the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China (“ROC
Constitution”). Soon after, however, the KMT government fled the mainland,
establishing a “government in exile” on Taiwan with the intent of reclaiming
the mainland in the future.
Over the next forty years, martial law and Temporary Provisions were
renewed indefinitely, thus providing legitimacy and legality to the KMT’s
authoritarian rule over the island. This became popularly known as the White
Terror period (bai se kong bu, 白色恐怖, 1949–1987) and represents the third
24

Id. at 104–09.
Id. at 141–67.
26
By 2005, the 228 Memorial Foundation issued compensations for 681 deaths, 177 disappearances,
and 1294 imprisonments. See Wu, supra note 5, at 90.
27
Chris Fuchs, 30 Years After End of Martial Law, Scars from Taiwan’s ‘White Terror’ Remain, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:53 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/40-years-after-end-martiallaw-scars-taiwan-s-white-n725251.
25

28

Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan (動員戡亂時期臨時條款) [Temporary Provisions
Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1948) (repealed 1991),
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000005.
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historical era in which state-sanctioned human rights abuses were inflicted
upon the population of Taiwan. 29 However, unlike the 228 Incident, the
victims during this period were not limited to Taiwanese and indigenous
peoples, but included thousands of mainlanders suspected of spying or being
communist sympathizers. Under the auspice of martial law, numerous minor
criminal offenses were re-categorized as “political” offenses.30 This allowed
the KMT to actively and legally employ courts-martial to try outspoken
civilians critical of the KMT’s rule and limit their options for appeal. Martial
law further allowed the KMT government to amass great wealth through
expropriation of private lands and the development of government
monopolies at the expense of local businesses.31 Although no official report
on the White Terror period has ever been commissioned, scholarly estimates
from surveys of extant and declassified case records indicate that 140,000
civilians were tried in courts-martial between 1949 and 1987, resulting in tens
of thousands of imprisonments, thousands of cases of property confiscation,
and roughly 3000 to 4000 executions.32
The national government in Taiwan, particularly in the initial two
decades of democratic rule, took a very conservative stance towards creation
and application of transitional justice mechanisms via the formal legislative
process despite the numerous human rights abuses evident from Taiwan’s past.
This is partially a result of the KMT’s continued dominance in Taiwan’s
newly minted democratic political landscape. Despite the three transfers of
executive power between the KMT and DPP since democratization was
initiated, there still exists an underlying public dissatisfaction with the formal
legislative responses of the national government.
The remainder of this Article compares the scope and language of
transitional justice legislation passed by the KMT-dominated legislature from
1987 to 2016 to the legislative bills introduced by the DPP in the early months
of the DPP-dominated legislature beginning in 2016.

29

See generally SU RUI-CHIANG ( 蘇 瑞 鏘 ), BAISE KONGBU ZAI TAIWAN: ZHANHOU TAIWAN

ZHENGZHI ANJIAN ZHI CHUZHI (白色恐怖在台灣:戰後台灣政治案件之處置) [WHITE TERROR IN TAIWAN:
POSTWAR POLITICAL PLACEMENT IN TAIWAN] (2014).
30
See Ming-min Peng, Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems, 47 CHINA Q. 471, 476
(1971).
31
Joseph Bosco, Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics, in THE OTHER
TAIWAN: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 114, 131–33 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 1994).
32
Hwang, supra note 5, at 170.
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THE

KMT-

Democratization and KMT Attempts to Rectify (and Dodge) Its
Past Wrongs

Despite Taiwan’s economic success and improved standard of living in
the 1980s, the KMT government found that after nearly forty years of oneparty rule, its domestic support had begun to wane and intraparty factionalism
increasingly threatened party unity.33 The legitimacy and political dominance
of the authoritarian KMT were further eroded by the results of limited
elections at the national and local levels, which showed increased political
gains by members of the fledgling “opposition,” known collectively as
dangwai ( 黨 外 , literally meaning “outside a political party”). 34 More
importantly, the KMT’s international support became evermore tenuous.
Countries like the United States, which formally recognized the People’s
Republic of China but continued to both politically and economically support
the de facto existence of the “free” Republic of China government in Taiwan,
found it increasingly difficult to justify continued support of a one-party
authoritarian government masquerading as a democracy.35
For these and other reasons, President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), the
son of Chiang Kai-shek, established a basic plan for lifting martial law and
transforming Taiwan into a constitutional democracy. He died in 1988,
however, and the task of refining and implementing these plans while
simultaneously protecting the assets and ensuring the continued existence of
the KMT throughout the process of democratization fell to then-Vice
President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝).
As Taiwan’s first native-born president, Lee was often able to mediate
concerns of the KMT and the local Taiwanese population during the

33

LINDA CHAO & RAMON H. MYERS, THE FIRST CHINESE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL LIFE IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 120–27 (1998).
34
STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER
THE COLD WAR 309–18 (2010);.See also Linda Chao & Ramon H. Myers, How Elections Promoted
Democracy in Taiwan Under Martial Law, 162 CHINA Q. 387, 391 (2000); HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT
TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 97–103 (1989).
35
JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? 369–72 (6th ed. 2013).
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transitional process.36 Under his leadership, martial law was formally lifted
in 1987, and the infamous Temporary Provisions were abolished in 1991.37
The removal of these restrictive laws and policies opened the door for greater
public participation, allowed for the formation of new political parties, and
loosened restrictions on the media. Furthermore, an interpretation of the
continued constitutionality of the Temporary Provisions by the Constitutional
Court required all officials originally elected in 1947 and 1948 on the
mainland to retire, 38 and a subsequent series of constitutional amendments
paved the way for the first round of full elections to be held since 1948.39
Through these political and constitutional changes, Taiwan’s
government peacefully transitioned from a one-party authoritarian state to a
constitutional democracy.40 Yet the specter of the past was never far behind,
and the KMT faced the necessity of winning free elections via an electorate
that it had oppressed for nearly forty years.
B.

Party Protectionism and the National Security Act of 1987

As democratization and free elections loomed on the horizon, the KMT
increasingly considered the political, as well as legal, implications of the
human rights abuses perpetrated by its government during the previous forty
years. Prior to lifting martial law in 1987, the government carried out two
attempts to insulate the KMT from the potential negative effects of its
authoritarian past. First, the KMT issued an amnesty to 237 political prisoners,
and second, the KMT introduced legislation that severely limited the ability
of civilians to appeal convictions originating in the courts-martial.

36

Ya-li Lu, Lee Tung-hui’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization: A Preliminary Assessment, in
ASSESSING THE LEE TUNG-HUI LEGACY IN TAIWAN’S POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 53, 55–61 (Bruce J. Dickson & Chien-min Chao eds., 2002).
37
The process of lifting martial law began with Chiang Ching-kuo, but was implemented by Lee. See
id. at 55.
38
Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 261, DAFAGUAN JIESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. June 21, 1990),
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=261.
39

HSIEH CHENG-TAO (謝正道), ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIUXIAN SHI (中華民國修憲史) [HISTORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 213–20 (2d ed. 2005).
40
Although the process was relatively peaceful, it was not necessarily smooth. Protests, charges of
continued corruption, etc. haunted Taiwan’s democratic transition. Some even argue that due to the continued
political dominance of the KMT after the transition, Taiwan has yet to fully transition. See, e.g., Peter R.
Moody, Jr., Some Problems in Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation, in ASSESSING THE LEE TUNG-HUI
LEGACY IN TAIWAN’S POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 36,
at 27; Kharis Templeman et al., Taiwan’s Democracy Under Chen Shui-bian, in TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY
CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN YEARS 1 (Yun-han Chu et al. eds., 2016).

April 2018

Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan

459

The first action occurred on July 14, 1987, when the Ministry of
Defense announced a partial amnesty (reduction of sentences and/or
restoration of rights) for 237 political prisoners in response to the negative
public opinion resulting from the KMT’s use of military courts to sentence
political opponents to lengthy prison sentences, life imprisonment, or death.41
Critics of this amnesty, however, quickly pointed out its limitations. Under
existing laws, individuals convicted of sedition or other political offenses
were barred from holding public office and from many other professions such
as civil servants, lawyers, and medical doctors.42 Thus, although they could
now vote in elections, many of the former authoritarian regime’s most ardent
opponents were excluded for life from holding government posts as a result
of their previous convictions.
The 237 individuals covered under the “token” partial amnesty
represent only a few of the tens of thousands of civilians tried for political
reasons in military courts and subsequently imprisoned or executed during the
White Terror period. For those remaining victims, the all-important Article
10 of the Martial Law Act would go into effect once martial law was lifted.43
Under the ROC Constitution, only active-duty military personnel may be tried
in a military court; 44 however, Articles 8 and 9 of the Martial Law Act provide
a list of offenses for which civilians may be tried by courts-martial during
times of emergency.45 Article 10 of this same act was originally designed as
a legal safeguard for the restoration of individual rights once the government
suspended the state of emergency. Specifically, Article 10 provided that
civilians sentenced for crimes or currently undergoing investigation or trial
via military courts were entitled to request a retrial or reconsideration by
civilian courts once martial law was lifted.46
The second action the KMT took arose from its fear of the potential
volume of citizen accusations and appeals. Thus, on the eve of the repeal of
martial law, the KMT-dominated legislature passed the 1987 National
41

Taiwan Ends Martial Law After 38 Years but...No Dancing in the Streets, TAIWAN COMMUNIQUÉ
(Int’l Comm. for Human Rights in Taiwan, The Hague, Neth.), Sept. 1987, at 6.
42
Id.
43

Jieyan Fa (戒嚴法) [Martial Law Act], art. 10, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1934) (amended 1948),
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=F0070002 [hereinafter Martial Law Act].
44
MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (1947) (Taiwan).
45
Martial Law Act arts. 8, 9.
46
Id. art. 10 (“Upon the day following the repeal of martial law, all sentences made under Article 8
and Article 9 [of this law], may be appealed in accordance with the law” (第八條第九條之判決，均得依
解嚴之翌日起，依法上訴)).
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Security Act (國家安全法).47 This act provided, inter alia, an article designed
to limit appeals by civilians sentenced in courts-martial during the
authoritarian period. Due to its importance, I have translated the entirety of
Article 9 below.
Original
第九條:

English Translation
Article 9:

戒嚴時期戒嚴地域內，經軍

Once martial law is repealed,
criminal cases of civilians tried by courts事審判機關審判之非現役軍人刑事
martial during the period of martial law
案件，於解嚴後依左列規定處理： shall be handled as follows:
一、 軍事審判程序尚未終結

9(1) Those [individuals] whose
者，偵查中案件移送該管檢察官偵 military trial proceedings have not
concluded: cases under investigation are to
查 ， 審判 中案 件移 送 該管 法院 審 be transferred to civil prosecutors for
investigation and cases at trial are to be
判。
transferred to civilian courts for trial.
9(2) Those [individuals] whose
criminal sentences have already been
得向該管法院上訴或抗告。但有再 decided may not appeal or complain to
審或非常上訴之原因者，得依法聲 civil courts. However, those with grounds
for retrial or extraordinary appeal may in
請再審或非常上訴。
accordance to the law petition for retrial or
extraordinary appeal.
二、 刑事裁判已確定者，不

9(3) Those [individuals] whose
criminal sentences have not begun or who
執行中者，移送該管檢察官指揮執 are currently serving their sentences are to
be transferred to and administered by
行。
civilian prosecutors.
三、 刑事裁判尚未執行或在

47

Guojia Anquan Fa ( 國 家 安 全 法 ) [National Security Act], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1987)
(amended 2013), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030028 [hereinafter
National Security Act].
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The implications of this article for Taiwan’s post-transition engagement
with human rights abuses were, and still are, tremendous. First, paragraphs 1
and 3 transfer control of civilian investigations, trials, and prisoners to civil
jurisdiction. Though fewer than in previous decades, by the mid-1980s there
were still numerous civilians imprisoned and awaiting trial in military courts
for political crimes.48 The transfer of such cases to civilian courts was an
initial step to demilitarize society.
However, more problematic was the fact that paragraph 2 of the
National Security Act nullified Article 10 of the original Martial Law Act,
which explicitly provided an automatic right of appeal for any and all
convictions of non-military persons under courts-martial during times of
emergency. Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the National Security Act
effectively precluded civilians who were tried for political offenses under
martial law or their families from appealing their convictions to civil courts.
By passing this law, the KMT not only insulated itself from potential
retribution and legal accountability, but also severely restricted the right of
tens of thousands of citizens to question the legality of military trials
conducted against civilians during the White Terror period.
The constitutionality of the National Security Act’s Article 9 was
immediately questioned by three civilians who had previously been convicted
for political offenses by military courts. 49 Their request for a constitutional
interpretation went all the way to the Constitutional Court in 1987. 50 The
Court, staffed by KMT appointees, sided with the government and confirmed
the constitutionality of the legislation.51 The Court held, inter alia, that due to
the lengthy period of martial law,52 the inaccessibility of documents related to
individual case reports resulting from the long lapse of time, 53 and the need to
retain the stability and consistency of the judicial process,54 the reinvestigation
48

Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/
1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-decades-of-martial-law.html (citing the Taiwan Defense Ministry’s
statement that it released twenty-three individuals and only thirty dissidents remained in custody).
49
J.Y. Interpretation No. 272, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=272.
50
Id.
51

For the Chinese-language version of the judgment, see Sifa Yuan (司法院) [Judicial Yuan], Sifa

Yuan Shi Zi 272 Hao Jieshi (司法院釋字 272 號解釋) [Explanation of Interpretation 272 of the Judicial
Yuan], 129 FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (法務部公報) [MINISTRY JUST. GAZETTE] 100 (1991).
52
Id. at 100.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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and retrial of all such cases were simply beyond the capacity of civilian
courts.55
Thus, by arguing for consistency and stability, the Court recused itself
from involvement in early efforts to promote transitional justice in Taiwan.
Furthermore, by not questioning the legality of the acts or judgments called
into question by the case, the Court tacitly validated and legitimized the
human rights abuses perpetrated by KMT officials during the martial law
period in Interpretation No. 272. Although the post-transition KMTdominated legislature would later pass three transitional justice acts in the
1990s, the passage of the National Security Act and its judicial support clearly
set the restrictive tone for transitional justice discourse and practice during the
early years of post-authoritarian Taiwan.56
C.

The Conservative Language of Transitional Justice Legislation
Under the KMT

Although the KMT initially feared retribution from the populace, the
party continued to win democratic elections. The KMT, therefore, controlled
both the legislature (1987–2016) and the presidency (1987–2000). By
extension, therefore, the KMT controlled the official government position on
transitional justice matters during the initial two decades of democracy in
Taiwan.
During this time, the KMT-dominated legislature introduced three
important (but limited) pieces of legislation related to transitional justice. The
conservative language and narrow scope of these laws highlight the
constraints placed on transitional justice mechanisms by local post-transition
political conditions. It was in these conditions that the former authoritarian
party retained much of its political power. Although the limitations of these
initial measures drew much criticism from the victims of the White Terror
period and left a feeling of the incompleteness of transitional justice in Taiwan,
there was little that could be done in terms of formal legislative approaches to
transitional justice while the KMT held its dominance in the legislature. This
section analyzes the limitations of the KMT promulgated laws in
chronological order of their passage.

55
56

Id.
Hwang, supra note 5, at 171.

April 2018

Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan

463

The first piece of post-transition legislation specifically aimed at past
abuses was the 1995 Act Governing the Recovery of Damage of Individual
Rights During the Period of Martial Rule (“1995 Recovery Act”).57 This Act
specifically covers individual cases occurring during the period between May
20, 1949 and July 14, 1987 in which the defendants were either charged but
found not guilty in courts-martial or were found guilty but can subsequently
prove their confessions were coerced.58 In addition to monetary reparations
for those who can prove their trials were carried out improperly,59 the Act
further provides for the full restoration of individual rights, allowing affected
persons to hold civil office or re-enter professional fields such as medicine,
law, and education.60 Though this Act provides some quantum of reparation
for the abuses of the past, its language necessarily constrains the applicable
cases to those occurring during the period of 1949–1987, thereby excluding
the victims of the 228 Incident. Furthermore, while some confessions may be
proven to have been coerced and their subsequent verdicts determined to be
unjust, the language of the Act establishes this as an administrative failing,
not an illegal or immoral act. Nowhere in the Act is the legality of the courtsmartial system utilized against civilians during martial law ever questioned.61
And finally, the Act is silent on the question of fact-finding for the purpose of
assigning responsibility and accountability for the incidents occurring during
the White Terror period.
The second major piece of transitional justice legislation was the 1995
February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act (“228 Compensation
Act”).62 For nearly forty years, the KMT had suppressed discussion of the
228 Incident; yet with democratization and the re-establishment of civil
freedoms of speech and press, the KMT found itself unable to escape the
influence of this event. 63 Unlike the “legal” use of courts-martial and
suppression of individual rights under martial rule, the KMT government
57

Jieyan Shiqi Renmin ShouSun Quanli Huifu Tiaoli (戒嚴時期人民受損權利回復條例) [Act
Governing the Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights During the Period of Martial Law], FAWUBU FAGUI
ZILIAOKU (1995) (amended 2000), http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=
A0000007.
58
Id. art 1.
59
Id. art 6.
60
Id. art 3.
61
Hwang, supra note 5, at 172.
62

Ererba Shijian Chuli ji Buchang Tiaoli (二二八事件處理及補償條例) [The February 28 Incident
Disposition and Compensation Act], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1995) (amended 2013),
http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0020013 [hereinafter The February 28 Incident
Disposition and Compensation Act].
63
Wang & Ku, supra note 5, at 10–11.
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brutality against the Taiwanese population in the aftermath of the 228 Incident
lacked any legal basis.
The memory of the event continued to be a heavily contentious issue,
dividing the population between those living in Taiwan prior to the 1945
retrocession and those arriving from the mainland after the retrocession. This
Act, therefore, was specifically aimed at the victims of the 228 Incident, and
one can argue that this piece of legislation was part of President Lee Tunghui’s ongoing attempt to close the identity gap among Taiwan’s population.64
This is reflected in the initial article of the Act that provides the rationale for
the legislation, which is “to cause citizens to understand the facts of the
incident, to heal historical wounds, and to promote ethnic unity and
harmony.”65 Such a statement is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the
individual and social harm inflicted by the incident, yet its efficacy is again
limited by the carefully crafted language which does not offer any
identification of those individuals actually responsible for its occurrence.
Here, again, the language of the legislation shelters individual members of the
KMT from criminal or civil liability or even official acknowledgment of their
participation.
To promote transitional justice, the Act provides for the establishment
of a schedule of reparation payments,66 a system to provide the restitution of
honor for victims or the descendants of those killed, wounded, tortured,
detained, or imprisoned, and compensation for individuals or their families
who had property damaged or confiscated during the period of statesanctioned violence. 67 Unlike the previous piece of legislation, however,
which focused primarily on reparations, the 228 Compensation Act provides
for the establishment of additional formal transitional justice mechanisms.
Article 3, for example, establishes the 228 Incident Memorial
Foundation (“Foundation”), which is to be governed by a selection of scholars,
civil activists, and victims of the incident (or their descendants). Individual
64

MELISSA J. BROWN, IS TAIWAN CHINESE?: THE IMPACT OF CULTURE, POWER, AND MIGRATION ON
CHANGING IDENTITIES 12 (2004); see generally Stéphane Corcuff, The Symbolic Dimension of
Democratization and the Transition of National Identity Under Lee Teng-hui, in MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE:
NATIONAL IDENTITY ISSUES AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW TAIWAN 92 (Stéphane Corcuff ed., Routledge 2015)
(2002).
65

The February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act art. 1 (“使國民瞭解事件真相, 撫平

歷史傷痛,促進族群融和”).
66
Id. art. 7.
67
Id. art. 6.
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applications for reparations and restitution of honor are submitted directly to
the Foundation, which in turn investigates each claim and administers
financial reparations.68 Furthermore, the Foundation promotes truth-finding
through research exercises, and provides educational awareness of the
incident via events and publications. 69 Article 4 of the Act provides an
additional measure of commemorative transitional justice by confirming the
annual date of February 28 as a national holiday, Peace Memorial Day (和平
紀念日).
Like the previous piece of legislation, however, the 228 Compensation
Act is limited in actually providing justice to victims. The very title of the
Act created controversy. This is because it uses the term bu chang (補償) for
“compensation,” which in Taiwanese administrative law implies a form of
compensation for harms resulting out of a legitimate process or procedure.70
This word choice reflects the continued stance of the KMT-dominated
legislature that the “wrongness” of the abuses was linked to individualized
cases of administrative failings of an otherwise legal and legitimate system.
Relatedly, the KMT’s enduring platform of the legality of its
governance methods during the 228 Incident is also evident in the fierce
legislative debates over the inclusion of the phrase “the government should
apologize to all citizens.” In the end, however, inclusion of the phrase was
voted down.71 The KMT could have viewed the possible inclusion of such an
explicit statement in a piece of legislation as an admission of wrongdoing.
This could undermine its continued stance over the legitimacy of its
government prior to and during the martial law period. Thus, while the 228
Compensation Act clearly differs from the 1995 Recovery Act by providing
reparations, establishing a foundation tasked with specific transitional justice
goals, and assigning February 28 as a national holiday, the language of both
Acts precludes ascribing any liability or blame to the KMT or any individual
associated with the authoritarian government.
The final major piece of transitional justice legislation passed by the
KMT-dominated legislature was the 1998 Compensation Act for Improper
Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage During the Martial Law Period
68
69
70
71

Id. arts. 6, 7.
Id. art. 11.
Wang & Ku, supra note 5, at 12–13.
Id. at 12.

466

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

(“1998 Compensation Act”). 72 This Act was the direct result of public
dissatisfaction with the KMT government and legislature’s lack of efforts to
properly address the abuses occurring during the White Terror period. 73
However, despite the public pressure for more comprehensive transitional
justice legislation, the 1998 Compensation Act follows the KMT’s trend of
legislating compensatory acts while precluding any inquiries over the
legitimacy of KMT rule or assigning any liability to specific individuals.
Like the 228 Compensation Act, this Act establishes another memorial
foundation comprised of scholars, civilians, judges, and government
representatives. The foundation is tasked with administering the applications,
investigations of claims, and payments to victims or their families. 74 The
legislation is quite limited in its scope, as it only covers individuals tried and
convicted of sedition (pan luan, 叛亂) or espionage (fei die, 匪諜) during the
martial law period.75 This limitation is further evidenced by a preclusion of
individuals who have already received any form of compensation via the 228
Compensation Act or who have received some measure of compensation via
the administrative appeal system for wrongful conviction.76 The same article
also bars any individual whose conviction could be upheld after
reconsideration from compensation.
All three pieces of transitional justice legislation represent the KMT’s
attempts to formally address its past wrongs primarily through legislating
reparations to victims. However, due to its continued control of the legislature,
the KMT directly controlled transitional legislation and was able to further
insulate itself from any official liability for past abuses during its authoritarian
rule.
Each law contains a similar set of limitations. First, the scope of each
law is temporally limited with explicit language confining the applicability of
each law’s provisions to a specific period of time. All three are limited to the
period of KMT rule following the retrocession in 1945. As such, harms and
72

Jieyan Shiqi Budang Panluan Ji Feidie Shenpan Anjian Bushang Tiaoli (戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪

諜審判案件補償條例) [Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage
During the Martial Law Period], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (1998) (amended 2006), http://law.moj.gov.tw/
ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=F0120018.
73
Hwang, supra note 5, at 172.
74
The February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act art. 3.
75
Id. art. 2.
76
Id. art. 3.
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losses that occurred during the Japanese colonial period are not considered or
applicable. This precludes numerous claims from Taiwan’s indigenous
communities.
Second, the primary focus of all three laws is on reparations as a means
of reconciliation.77 The 228 Compensation Act and 1995 Recovery Act both
commemorate forms of transitional justice by establishing memorial
foundations and promoting educational events occurring during KMT rule;
however, the function of such acts is to understand the events and assist the
victims without consideration of responsibility.
This relates to the third restriction, which is a limitation on ascertaining
the “truth.” Unlike many transitional societies, the KMT never established a
truth and reconciliation committee to determine the sources of and
responsibility for abuse. To do so would call into question the legitimacy of
state-sanctioned violence during the authoritarian period. Thus, not a single
individual has been prosecuted for acts committed during the period from
1945 to 1987. Instead, each law acknowledges the loss and/or harm inflicted
on the civilian populace. Thus, while the transitional justice legislation passed
by the KMT did provide financial benefits to many of those who had suffered
under KMT oppression, the language was crafted in such a way as to elude
consideration of the accountability or criminal liability of the perpetrators.
D.

Continued Public Dissatisfaction with KMT-Led Transitional
Justice: 2000–2016

The early years of democratic rule in Taiwan saw many positive
changes; yet lurking in the background was the ever-present specter of the
past and a palpable public dissatisfaction with the state of KMT-dominated
transitional justice practice. In 2000, the KMT’s dominance was tested when
the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the presidential election and
was re-elected by a razor-thin margin in 2004. However, despite the DPP’s
success in gaining the presidency, the party was never able to eclipse the KMT
coalition majority (known as the “Pan-Blue” coalition) within the
legislature.78 As a result, Chen Shui-bian’s two terms in office were fraught
with persistent policy gridlock between the DPP-held executive and KMT77

Jemima García-Godos, Reparations, in AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 7,
at 177, 182–85.
78
Shiow-duan Hawang, Executive-Legislative Relations Under Divided Government, in TAIWAN’S
DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN YEARS, supra note 40, at 123.
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held legislature, with the latter opposing nearly all government proposals
requiring legislative approval.79
There were, however, some small legislative victories for the DPP-led
attempt at transitional justice. First, in 2007, an amendment altered the title
of the 228 Compensation Act. As mentioned previously, the former title
utilized the term bu chang for “compensation,” indicating an administrative
compensation for harm resulting from a legal act. With very little media
attention or legislative debate, the amendment changed the term to pei chang
(賠償), which denotes a form of compensation for a harm resulting from an
illegal act.80 This subtle shift in title implies that the acts perpetrated under
the guise of government-sanctioned legality were in fact illegal acts for which
the government at the time should be held responsible. Unfortunately, Chen
had little power or influence over the judiciary and other government offices,
and this change in title and its significance went unnoticed.
Second, in 2003 and 2007, the Constitutional Court issued two
interpretations concerning the constitutionality of victim-category exclusions
enshrined in Taiwan’s existing transitional justice legislation. In 2003, the
Court issued Interpretation No. 567, which held that, despite the extraordinary
circumstances of martial law, the military courts’ continued use of
rehabilitative labor for civilians after the completion of their prison sentences
during this period violated Article 8 of the ROC Constitution. 81 Furthermore,
the original implementation of the 1995 Recovery Act in conjunction with the
1987 National Security Act prevented such individuals from receiving
compensation. This ruling expanded the scope of the 1995 Recovery Act and
implicitly labeled the KMT government’s use of indefinite rehabilitation
detention during the martial law period as unconstitutional. In 2007, the Court
issued Interpretation No. 624, which held that precluding civilians wrongfully
convicted in military courts from receiving compensation was
unconstitutional.82 The original wording of the 1987 National Security Act
79
Thomas Weishing Huang, The President Refuses to Cohabit: Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan, 15
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 375, 384 (2006).
80

Legislative Yuan, Ererba shijian chuli ji peichang tiaoli de san du (二二八事件處理及賠償條例

的三讀) [Third Reading of the February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act], LIFA YUAN
GONGBAO (立法院公報) [LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Mar. 21, 2007, at 88, 93.
81
J.Y. Interpretation No. 567, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Oct. 24, 2003), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=567.
82
J.Y. Interpretation No. 624, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=624.
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only provided paid compensation for those who were detained but could prove
themselves innocent, and this proof was limited to those who had not carried
out their sentence. Additionally, the wording of the 1995 Recovery Act
further precluded individuals convicted in courts-martial who had completed
their sentences from equal reparation payments. Therefore, the Court ordered
such cases to be reconsidered.
Both rulings greatly expanded the scope of victim claimants under the
three pieces of transitional justice legislation. But, like the lawmakers in the
KMT-dominated legislature, the Court stopped short of making an explicit
statement about the responsibility or liability of any individual person or
group for the wrongs committed under KMT rule.
Lastly, as Chen Shui-bian neared the end of his final term in office, he
called for a national referendum on transitional justice in an attempt to push a
legislative agenda that would deal with KMT party assets. These assets were
a key reason for the KMT’s continued political resilience after
democratization. During the martial law period, the KMT government
utilized dubious forms of confiscation of personal wealth and property from
political opponents, procured large swaths of land via land grabs, and
established numerous state-owned (i.e., KMT-owned) enterprises protected
by government monopolies.83 As a result, over its forty years in power, the
KMT amassed an enormous portfolio of assets, including cash reserves, rental
properties, and corporations. 84 The KMT’s ability to shield these assets
during the transition period allowed the party to retain a great deal of political
influence. No other political party (the first new party being allowed to form
in 1988) could compete with the KMT’s wealth.85

83

TIEN, supra note 34, at 86–87.
Some have argued that the KMT assets are worth roughly NT$150 billion. The KMT’s own
government financial disclosures provide net worth estimates of NT$33.1 billion in 2005 and NT$25.6 billion
in 2013. For an analysis of the political arguments over the KMT assets, see DAFYDD FELL, PARTY POLITICS
IN TAIWAN: PARTY CHANGE AND THE DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN, 1991–2004, at 77–78 (2005).
84

For analysis of the KMT’s own disclosures, see Jeang Bang-wen (蔣邦文), Yi di er ci zhengdang lun ti wei
li, xi lun Taiwan zhuanxing zhengyi de shijian (以第二次政黨輪替為例,析論台灣轉型正義的實踐) [An
Analysis of the Practice of Transitional Justice in Taiwan Using the Second Ruling Party Alternation as a
Case Example], 7 TAIPEI HAIYANG JISHU XUEYUAN XUEBAO (台北海洋技術學院學報) [J. TAIPEI C. MAR.
TECH.] 2 at 90, 100 (2016).
85
Bang-wen, supra note 84, at 106 (citing official reports indicating that in 2013 the KMT held an
estimated NT$25.6 billion in assets, while its primary competitor the DPP held an estimated NT$478.72
million in assets).

470

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

The source of this political wealth was a contentious issue among the
population, which believed the assets should be returned to those who lost
them during the martial law period, or to their families. In 2000, Chen Shuibian attempted to push through a legislative bill that would force the KMT to
return all assets gained illicitly during the martial law period. However, this
bill did not have a chance given the continued KMT control over the
legislature.86 Towards the end of his final year in office, in an effort to frame
the upcoming presidential election campaign around the issues of transitional
justice and KMT party assets, and to instigate a renewed drive for further
transitional justice legislation, Chen called for a public referendum. The
language of Chen’s referendum question was posed as follows:
Original

English Translation
Do you agree that the
你是否同意依下列原則制定
following principles should be
「政黨不當取得財產處理條例」， adhered to when legislating an
Administration
of
Illicitly
將中國國民黨黨產還給全民：
Acquired Assets of Political
Parties Act for the purpose of
returning to the people the party
assets of the Kuomintang?
The properties of the
Kuomintang and its affiliate
產，除黨費、政治獻金及競選補 organizations—excluding
party
助金外，均推定為不當取得的財 dues, political donations, and public
electoral subsidies—should all be
產，應還給人民。已處分者，應 presumed illicitly acquired and
ought to be returned to the people.
償還價額。
That which has already been
liquidated, the [KMT] ought to
compensate at market value.
國 民 黨 及 其附 隨組 織 的 財

Like Chen’s other attempts to further transitional justice practice in
Taiwan, the referendum was thwarted, but this time not directly by the KMT.
Instead, the referendum was defeated by low voter turnout—only 26.34% of
86

Kuo Cheng-tian (郭承天), Taiwan zhuan xing zhengyi yanjiu de zhuanxing (台灣轉型正義研究的

轉型) [Research in Transition on Taiwan’s Transitional Justice], 12 TAIWAN ZHENGZHI XUE KAN (台灣政
治學刊) [TAIWANESE POL. SCI. REV.] 3, 6 (2008).
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registered voters participated. 87 This fell well below the 50% threshold
required by the Referendum Act,88 and thus nullified the results.
Despite its failure, the language of the referendum represents an explicit
attempt by the DPP government to directly associate the KMT with illegal
activities during the martial law period. The referendum question does not
discuss the physical harms inflicted on individuals under the KMT regime,
but it does address the property and financial harms inflicted on the Taiwanese
populace from which the KMT continued to benefit. Although the
referendum results were nullified, of the 4,550,881 individuals who voted,
91.46% agreed with the proposal.89 This demonstrates a continuing public
consciousness among a significant part of society that directly links the
“incompleteness” of Taiwan’s transitional justice to the financial assets of the
KMT, and, more specifically, the illegal means through which the KMT
amassed such a fortune during the martial law period.
Despite their attempts, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP could do little to
legislate further transitional justice in Taiwan. Public frustration with the DPP
government’s inability to govern with the KMT-dominated legislature, and
allegations against Chen for corruption, as well as later convictions of Chen
and his family on those charges, led to a significant drop in the public’s
opinion of the party.90
With the election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to the
presidency in 2008 and 2012, the Taiwanese government and legislature
reverted to full KMT control. During Ma’s two terms in office, very little was
accomplished in the way of formal transitional justice legislation. Yet many
of the KMT government policies—particularly those related to increased

87

Press Release, Zhongyang Xuanju Weiyuanhui (中央選舉委員會) [Central Election Committee],
Gonggao Quanguo Xing Gongmin Toupiao An Di 3 An, Di 4 An Liang Xiang Gongmin Toupiao An Toupiao
Jieguo (公告全國性公民投票案第 3 案、第 4 案兩項公民投票案投票結果) [Public Announcement of the
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economic relations with China—provoked a great deal of public outrage.91
Eventually, the KMT found itself with extremely low opinion polls and
dwindling popular support. As a result, the combined presidential and
legislative elections of 2016 provided hope that the DPP could not only win
the presidency back, but also finally break nearly seventy years of KMT
dominance over the legislature.92
IV.

A SECOND WAVE
LEGISLATURE
A.

OF

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION: THE DPP

The 2016 Elections and Revisiting Transitional Justice

In the heated campaign leading up to the 2016 presidential and
legislative elections, the specter of past abuses at the hands of the KMT
government and public dissatisfaction with the scope of extant transitional
justice legislation became prime topics of debate. The discourse often focused
on two specific issues: the continued lack of accountability for the events that
occurred during the White Terror period and the failure of previous
governments to adequately confront the KMT over its financial assets
acquired during the martial law period.93
The campaign pledges of the DPP legislative candidates, and especially
the presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), promised to deal with these
two issues via specific transitional justice legislation. For example, Tsai’s
presidential campaign platform rested on “five pillars of reform,” of which the
fourth was specifically dedicated to transitional justice.94 Tsai’s approach to
transitional justice as political discourse focused on the KMT’s lack of
accountability over its historical role in perpetrating abuses during the martial
91
See generally John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Taiwan in 2014: A Besieged President amid Political Turmoil,
55 ASIAN SURV. 142 (2015).
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STRATEGIC REL. 313, 314 (2016); Jeffrey T. Martin, Policing an Occupied Legislature: Symbolic Struggle
over the Police Image in Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, 45 H.K. L.J. 229, 231–32 (2015).
93
See, e.g., Christian Schafferer, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: An Austrian Perspective, 6 J.
CONTEMP. EASTERN ASIA 17, 17 (2017). See generally Christian Schafferer, Debating “Unpopular” Issues
in Taiwan, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: A HUMAN-CENTERED APPROACH TO
EVALUATING DEMOCRACY 130 (Brendan Howe ed., 2015).
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DIAN LIANG TAIWAN (點亮台灣) [LIGHT UP TAIWAN] (Aug. 16, 2015), http://iing.tw/posts/51, translated in
VOTE 2016: Tsai Ing-wen’s Five Major Reforms, THINKING TAIWAN (Sept. 17, 2015), http://iing.tw/en/21.
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law period, as well as the methods by which the KMT gained its vast financial
assets.
This approach is reflected in three key elements of her published
transitional justice political platform. The first element offered a measure of
acknowledgement of the suffering Taiwan’s indigenous communities had
endured not only at the hands of the Republic of China government, but also
at the hands of Japanese colonialists. Tsai promised that, if elected, she would
“offer an official apology to Aborigines on behalf of the government,”95 an
act quite similar to the one made by former president Lee Tung-hui to victims
of the 228 Incident. Second, Tsai pledged that, if elected, her government
would “bravely face the past,” for:
We will not neglect errors because they are in the past. Likewise,
because past rulers used national violence to hurt and bully the
citizens, we have the historical wounds of [the] 228 [Massacre]
and the White Terror. We can forgive, but we cannot forget. We
must face up to it, and we cannot allow this history to be
tampered with.96
The third element specifically promised to deal with the illicitly gained assets
of the KMT, which Tsai opines “is the greatest defect in Taiwanese
democracy,” primarily because it “prevents fair competition between
parties.”97
Each of these campaign pledges reflects the significant legislative gaps
in Taiwan’s transitional justice experience. As already noted, these gaps
existed primarily due to the KMT’s ability to hold a legislative majority after
democratization, and thereby insulate its members and assets from any
potential legislative drafts attempting to ascribe individual accountability or
threatening to investigate and seize the party’s financial assets. Mindful of
Chen Shui-bian’s past ineffectiveness at legislating transitional justice via a
KMT-dominated legislature, Tsai ended her platform’s discussion of
transitional justice with the qualifying statement that a positive future required
not just the presidency, but also required “progressive forces” to “win a
legislative majority.”98
95
96
97
98
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Id.
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That is exactly what happened for Tsai and the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen took
the presidency with 56.1% of the vote, easily outdistancing her opponents—
KMT candidate Eric Chu (朱立倫) received 31% and People’s First Party
candidate James Soong ( 宋 楚 瑜 ) received 12.8%. 99 More importantly,
however, the DPP won a legislative majority for the first time in Taiwan’s
democratic history. The 2016 legislative election results saw the DPP
increase their seats from 40 to 68 (with 57 needed for a majority in the 113
seat Legislative Yuan), while the KMT representation nearly halved from 64
seats to only 35 seats.100 This allows the DPP to initiate and pass legislation
without the need for direct negotiations with the KMT in order to obtain the
required majority votes to pass a bill. For transitional justice in Taiwan, the
election meant that for the first time any aspect of Taiwan’s authoritarian past
had a fair chance of legislative consideration and the KMT would be unable
to stop any legislative bill reaching the floor for a final reading.
In her inaugural speech, President Tsai reiterated the importance of
transitional justice for Taiwan as a society to move forward. She stated that
“the goal of transitional justice is to pursue true social reconciliation, so that
all Taiwanese can take to heart the mistakes of that era.”101 Throughout the
speech, the scope of transitional justice was clearly expanded to reflect
society’s palpable discontent with the limited scope and time frame of the
KMT legislation. The goals laid out by Tsai’s inaugural address focused on
investigation and truth-finding as key mechanisms for social reconciliation,
and also diverged from previous practice by specifically highlighting the
transitional and historical justice issues of Taiwan’s indigenous
communities. 102 With control over the legislature, presidency, and
executive,103 the DPP legislators wasted little time in submitting two pieces of
legislation in an attempt to fulfill some of Tsai’s campaign promises during
the much anticipated “first 100 days.”
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Re-Legislating Transitional Justice: DPP Legislative Efforts
1.

Political Party Assets and Affiliates

Although the DPP caucus proposed two transitional justice bills to the
legislature, the first to pass, and possibly the most contentious, was the 2016
Act Governing the Handling of Illicit Assets of Political Parties and Their
Affiliates (“2016 Illicit Assets Act”).104 Reflecting both Tsai’s desire to create
a level playing field for all of Taiwan’s political parties and the public’s
continued disapproval of the wealth of the KMT, the 2016 Illicit Assets Act
specifically targets party assets acquired from 1945 to 1987—the years in
which the KMT held an authoritarian monopoly on political power and the
formation of other political parties was illegal. Furthermore, because the
KMT did not hold all of its assets in name, but utilized several affiliate
institutions and organizations to both acquire and manage assets, the original
bill was broadened to include “affiliates” (fusui zuzhi, 附 隨組織 ). The
legislative sessions in which the bill was debated were fraught with high
tempers, as the KMT, unable to stop the bill’s eventual passage with its
minority, attempted to use all available procedural maneuvers to stall the bill’s
passage.105 It further attempted to sway public opinion against the bill through
a media campaign that labeled the 2016 Illicit Assets Act as the beginnings of
an era of “Green Terror” (lüse kongbu, 綠色恐怖), with green being the color
traditionally associated with the DPP.106 These attempts, however, failed, and
the bill passed its third reading in an extraordinary legislative session on July
25, 2016.
The 2016 Illicit Assets Act is comprised of thirty-four individual
articles organized in five chapters. The Act clearly outlines its transitional
justice objectives. The initial article defines the purpose of the Act as “to
investigate and deal with those party assets and the assets of affiliates illicitly
obtained; establish an equal and fair competitive environment for all political
104
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Organizations], FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (2016), http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?
PCode=A0030286.
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parties; institute a fully-fledged democracy; and further the implementation of
transitional justice.”107 To accomplish this, the Act calls for the establishment
of a committee under the Executive comprised of eleven to thirteen
individuals selected by the Prime Minister and serving four-year terms.108 To
ensure fairness in proceedings, membership drawn from those with party
affiliations may not exceed one third of the total for any single party. 109 The
Act also restricts any member of the committee who is also a member of a
political party from engaging in any party meetings or events while serving as
a committee member.110
The Illicit Assets Committee meets once per month and is tasked with
investigating and compiling information on alleged illicit assets, as well as
seizing and, if possible, reinstating such properties to their original owner.111
To do this, the Act provides the Committee with broad powers such as directly
requesting information from political parties and government offices, sending
representatives to political party headquarters and government offices to
obtain documentation, and sending written requests for interviews with
individuals.112 In addition to these powers, the Committee can also issue fines
to political parties or their affiliates if they are found to be obstructing an
investigation or attempting to liquidate assets under investigation.
Related to this, the Act requires political parties and their affiliates that
were active during the period of 1945–1987 to issue full reports of all assets
clearly stating the asset value, asset origins (with evidence), date of
acquisition, and evidence of means of transfer. 113 Furthermore, the Act
prohibits political parties from liquidating any assets under investigation
without approval of the Illicit Assets Committee.114
Since its formation under the leadership of Wellington Koo (Koo Lihsiung, 顧立雄), the Illicit Assets Committee has actively pursued the KMT’s
vast financial resources. The Committee has frozen nearly all of the KMT’s
107
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bank accounts, making it difficult for the KMT to pay its employee salaries,
and has also begun the process of investigating the political party’s vast
property empire.115 It is still too early to measure the extent to which the
Committee’s activities will contribute to the public’s sense of transitional
justice; however, since its formation, the Committee has endeavored to fulfill
Tsai’s pledge of dismantling the KMT’s vast financial resources to create a
more equitable and competitive environment for multi-party democratic
elections.
2.

The Promotion of Transitional Justice Bill

In addition to the Illicit Assets Act, the DPP caucus also submitted a
Promotion of Transitional Justice Bill (“Transitional Justice Bill”) 116
specifically targeting the knowledge gap of victims, abusers, and perpetrators
during the White Terror period.117 However, much to the disappointment of
many involved, after the passage of the 2016 Illicit Assets Act, the
Transitional Justice Bill stalled in the Legislative Yuan.118 Transitional justice
is merely one issue currently confronting the DPP government, and other
legislative bills related to the economy, environment, and increasingly hostile
cross-straits relations have taken priority.119
Recently, Tsai reiterated her hopes that the bill would pass; however,
efforts in the Executive Yuan appeared to indicate that the fate of this bill was
115
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116
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uncertain.120 As early as her inaugural speech, Tsai exhibited some skepticism
over the future of the bill, and later announced that she intended to establish a
truth and reconciliation committee within the president’s office.121 Relatedly,
Tsai pledged to establish a commission to produce the first ever
comprehensive account of the White Terror period.122 Yet, without supporting
legislative authority, it would be difficult to speculate how effective
presidential committees could be at locating and obtaining documentation
related to the abuses that occurred under martial law.123 Despite the stalling
of the Transitional Justice Bill in the legislature, President Tsai seemed
adamant to complete her campaign and inaugural speech pledges to fill the
“gaps” in Taiwan’s transitional justice experience.
To the surprise of this author and many others, very late in Taiwan’s
2017 fall legislative session, the DPP managed to push the Transitional Justice
Bill through its third and final reading.124 The newly passed 2017 Promotion
of Transitional Justice Act functions much the same as the 2016 Illicit Assets
Act. The Act covers the period from August 15, 1945 to November 6, 1992.125
The Act provides for the establishment of a truth commission under the
Executive Yuan, consisting of nine individuals selected by the Prime Minister
and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan.126 This article also sets limits on the
number of committee members from any single political party and sets a quota
for gender representation.127 Furthermore, all members of the committee are
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forbidden from participating in any political party activities while they are
serving their terms.128
The committee possesses a range of mandates and powers to collect
from individuals, political parties, and government offices all available
documentation relating to abuses occurring during the White Terror period.129
The committee is also empowered to fine individuals, political parties, and
government officials for obstructing investigations or destroying related files
or other relevant documentation.130 At first blush, this Act seems to address
some of the crucial “gaps” in knowledge about the events and abuses
occurring during the White Terror period. Yet unlike any previous
transitional justice legislation, this Act also contains provisions allowing the
committee to assign responsibility for acts committed during the White Terror
period and provides a measure of punitive accountability for individuals.
In perhaps the most striking example of the Act’s powers, it provides
the committee with the authority to remove symbols of the authoritarian
period. The committee is authorized to remove numerous statues of Chiang
Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, and is permitted to rename a large number
of public sites, schools, and universities named after these figures.131 Moving
quickly after the bill’s passage, Minister of Education Pan Wen-chung (潘文
忠) stated that he would meet with schools in Taiwan that are named after
Chiang Kai-shek to discuss how the Transitional Justice Act requires them to
remove the name.132 This is perhaps the most direct attempt to place blame
on those public figures involved in the abuses under KMT rule.
Additionally, the committee is empowered to revisit and retry cases
from the White Terror period. The committee is further authorized to provide
various sanctions for those individuals who were complicit in perpetrating
miscarriages of justice. 133 Such measures focus on a form of procedural
justice and administrative accountability of judicial and military personnel for
improper trials of civilians during the authoritarian period. They do not,
128
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however, extend to specific criminal trials of individuals. Regardless, the
2017 Promotion of Transitional Justice Act has greatly increased the scope of
transitional justice within Taiwan. How it will function in practice remains to
be seen.
The KMT has always been critical of the DPP version of the
Transitional Justice Bill, and had even supplied its own version. 134 After
decades of limiting the legislative scope of transitional justice, it is now the
KMT that criticizes the language and scope of transitional justice legislation
produced by the DPP. For example, KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義)
voiced criticism of the temporal scope of the bill for only focusing on the
period in which the KMT ruled Taiwan to the exclusion of the colonial periods
of the Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish.135 Such narrowness once again leaves
unresolved many issues related to transitional justice claims of Taiwan’s
Austronesian peoples.
Furthermore, the KMT is critical of the
constitutionality of the Transitional Justice Committee’s mandate that
combines both executive and judicial powers.136 It seems likely that the KMT
will soon attempt to petition the Constitutional Court to interpret the
constitutionality of the Transitional Justice Act.137 At this point, however, the
Transitional Justice Act exists and will be a key part of Taiwan’s future
progress towards social reconciliation.
V.

REMAINING “GAPS” IN TAIWAN’S TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

There are clear differences in the scope and language of the KMT-era
versus the DPP-era transitional justice legislation. Because the KMT retained
an elected majority in the legislature, it could directly control the official
stance on transitional justice. The former authoritarian party’s transitional
justice legislation, therefore, emphasized reparations and limited
acknowledgement, while precluding any consideration of criminal liability,
individual accountability, or the necessity of amnesty. The very fact that the
KMT remained in power for so long after the democratic transition provided
an unofficial amnesty to those who had perpetrated abuses during the
authoritarian period. Once the DPP won a legislative majority after twenty
years of KMT dominance, for the first time the scope of transitional justice
134
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legislation was unbound. Therefore, the DPP legislation attempts to fill the
“gaps” of accountability, knowledge, and finances, with specific legislative
language.
Yet not everyone is happy with the DPP’s transitional justice legislative
agenda. Like the KMT legislation, the DPP’s bills also contain language that
limits the applicability of transitional justice measures. Both the 2016 Illicit
Assets Act and the Transitional Justice Act are temporally constrained to the
period when the KMT ruled. This excludes consideration of the transitional
justice needs of those who suffered abuse and loss under Japanese colonialism
(1895–1945), or even prior to the Japanese occupation.
This excluded period is particularly troubling for Taiwan’s indigenous
communities. As the Japanese attempted to pacify the “savage aborigines,”
many of these communities lost vast amounts of their land and fell victim to
massacres at the hands of the Japanese.138 Although Tsai Ing-wen fulfilled her
pledge to formally apologize to the indigenous communities on behalf of the
national government, 139 the primary legislative proposals for transitional
justice submitted by the DPP do not explicitly mention the issues and claims
of Taiwan’s indigenous communities.
As a result, numerous bills have been submitted to the Legislative Yuan
explicitly dealing with “aboriginal transitional justice” (yuanzhumin
zhuanxing zhengyi, 原 住 民 轉 型 正 義 ) or “aboriginal historical justice”
(yuanzhumin lishi zhengyi, 原住民歷史正義).140 Most submissions seek full
or partial restoration of aboriginal lands expropriated via Japanese colonialism
or KMT coercion. Additionally, many bills request a measure of historical
justice. Similar to the issues with truth-seeking, there are many tribes which
the Taiwanese government does not specifically recognize as “aboriginal” or
as a distinct tribe, thus their cultural and political representation remains
138
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limited. 141 Many of the bills, therefore, request research and official
clarification of the complexity of the indigenous tribes of Taiwan. In partial
response to this, Tsai recently established the Presidential Indigenous
Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee (Yuanzhu minzu lishi
zhengyi yu zhuanxing zhengyi wei yuan hui, 原住民族歷史正義與轉型正
義委員會) tasked with managing many of these issues. 142 The DPP must
ensure that transitional justice is all-encompassing, otherwise its legislation
runs the risk of being categorized as myopic, much like the previous
legislation of the KMT.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has demonstrated how the local, post-transition conditions
of individual locales impact the scope and timeline of transitional justice.
Taiwan represents a fascinating example. Its experience of transitional justice
has been extremely slow to develop and quite conservative. Furthermore, it
has been viewed with varying levels of ambivalence by the government and
populace. One important factor influencing Taiwan’s transitional justice
experience has been the political resilience of the KMT, the former
authoritarian party.
Yet with the transition of political power and control of the legislature
to the DPP, the modes of engagement and the priorities of “transitional justice”
are again constrained by various factors. The pursuit of the KMT assets bill
could be argued as important for its influence on the democratic functioning
of Taiwan’s government and electoral system. Yet, after it passed, the
political drive for the Transitional Justice Act waned. It took an extraordinary
effort to get the Transitional Justice Act through its final reading, and the DPP
should be commended for that success. However, questions remain as to how
well this committee will function; how it will utilize its considerable range of
powers; and whether the public will view its work as contributing to national
healing and reconciliation, or alternatively as deepening lingering ethnic and
social tensions. The recent activities of the Illicit Assets Committee raise the
question of whether the DPP transitional justice is actually about confronting
141
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the past and healing old wounds or is simply a case of revenge against a long
dominating political party.143 The DPP government and legislature are still in
their early days. How transitional justice advances during the remaining years
of Tsai’s presidency remains to be seen. In order to be successful, however,
the government will need to ensure that its methods bring about the desired
reconciliation rather than further bifurcation of society, and it will need to
ensure that its transitional justice policies are inclusive of all groups,
especially the indigenous communities that have traditionally been
marginalized.
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